I. INTRODUCTION
While there is extensive literature on presidential war powers, 1 to my knowledge there has never been a comprehensive listing of the TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:649 relevant legal opinions provided by the executive branch. This Bibliography of executive branch legal opinions on war powers since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 is therefore intended as an aid to future scholarship. The opinions are listed in chronological order. Most have been published as public documents, although some were confidential at the time they were written. The once-confidential documents are available from presidential libraries, and I have provided the information necessary for the library archivists to retrieve them. This Bibliography is limited to opinions that are related to the initiation of war, including the interpretation of the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR). 
III. BRIEF COMMENTARY
Many scholars believe that President Harry S. Truman's June 1950 decision to intervene in Korea without asking for a declaration of war or other authorization from the Congress marked a departure from previous practice. 4 Whether or not this is true, it appears that there are many more executive branch opinions concerning war powers after 1950.
Prior to 1950, there were instances when the executive branch thought it necessary to compile lists of presidential military actions abroad. 5 During World War II, for example, the Department of State began to assemble lists of presidentially ordered foreign interventions in order to justify U.S. participation in an international military force. The idea was that once the U.N. Charter was ratified by the Senate, the President would be solely responsible for deciding when U.S. forces would be used. 6 These internal compilations were publicized as the war ended by James Grafton Rogers, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration. He published a substantial pamphlet addressing the question of whether the United States could constitutionally participate in an international police force designed to provide collective security. 7 Rogers assumed the United Nations would [Vol. 87:649 be formed and, when formed, would have an enforcement arm designed to perform peacekeeping functions. 8 He sounded some key themes that later would be elaborated on by both the executive branch and scholars defending a broad view of presidential war powers. 9 Rogers's work might have influenced the first legal opinion on the list, drafted by the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser, that defended the constitutionality of President Truman's decision to intervene in Korea.
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The executive branch also prepared a supplemental statement of legal authorities supporting the decision, which was published as a committee print of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in 1951. Also relevant was a memorandum prepared by U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach in the months preceding President Lyndon Johnson's crucial July 1965 decision to escalate or "Americanize" the war.
13
The Katzenbach memorandum is not as familiar to scholars as some of the others, so I quote it here. Katzenbach analyzed the limits on presidential authority to wage war as follows:
In the absence of some action by Congress, the only legal limitation on the power of the President to commit the armed forces arises by implication from Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, under which only Congress is authorized to "declare war." I believe it is a fair, although not uncontroversial, summary of nearly two centuries of history to say that the power to "declare war" is the power to confer substantially unlimited authority to use the armed forces to conquer and, if necessary, subdue a foreign nation. Unless such unlimited authority is exercised by the President, his legal position in using the armed forces is sustainable. It has been argued that the President may, 8. See id. at 7.
9.
For the use of Rogers's work as authority by the executive branch, see supra Part II, bibliog. #17, at 9. without Congressional approval, take only urgent defensive measures, or that he may take only minor police measures that are not likely to commit the United States to full scale war. However, the action taken by President Truman in Korea, which is not widely regarded as having been illegal, shows how extensive the powers of the President may be. The same illustration also shows how inextricably tied together the legal and policy issues involved in such a situation necessarily are.
14 Katzenbach's analysis showed the influence of President Truman's Korea "precedent" and the view, common in the executive branch at least throughout the Cold War, that the "declare war" clause was not a limit on presidential power, except perhaps in a situation similar to World War II.
The most interesting memorandum relevant to the Vietnam War was written by William Rehnquist, who later became the Chief Justice of the United States. 15 Besides the interest of his later prominence, in some ways this was the most candid memorandum because it directly confronted the fact that the available historical precedents pointed in different directions.
Next is an opinion by U.S. Attorney General Elliot Richardson on the constitutionality of the WPR, 16 which had just been passed by Congress. It is unclear whether Richardson's memorandum had significant influence on President Richard Nixon's subsequent veto message, which was apparently drafted by the State Department. 17 But because it was previously unknown, it is provided in Appendix F to this Bibliography.
Richardson believed declarations of war were inappropriate in a variety of situations in which the United States might become involved, including insurgencies and circumstances involving "terror groups." Two items in connection with the 1991 Persian Gulf War deserve mention, as they are available only from the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. These are memoranda from White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray justifying the constitutionality of launching a war to remove Iraqi forces after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
22 They are provided in Appendices G and H. At bottom, Gray believed that congressional authorization was required only when the United States intended to wage aggressive (offensive) war. As a general matter, he reasoned that because the United States does not engage in aggressive war, "the Executive branch has generally held that the President can order U.S. forces into combat without a declaration of war." believe it is legally sufficient to proceed with no formal congressional authorization at all. 24 Gray also noted that counsel in the executive branch believed the WPR's "sixty-day clock" to be unconstitutional. 25 Among the various OLC opinions listed, a number of legal scholars and attorneys who have served in the executive branch have cited the Haiti and Bosnia opinions as influential. 26 These opinions relied on historical practice in supporting presidential authority to deploy troops to those countries. But they also drew a distinction between deployments involving a limited risk of casualties as opposed to "'war' in the constitutional sense."
27 Presumably OLC was saying that full-scale wars would raise considerably different constitutional questions than the more limited deployments at issue during the Clinton Administration. The OLC opinion with respect to President Barack Obama's intervention in Libya followed the analysis in these Clinton Administration opinions. 28 It is noteworthy, however, that the OLC analysis authored by U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo during the administration of President George W. Bush did not follow the Clinton Administration's analysis. 29 OLC opinions on war powers thus appear to point in different directions depending on which party holds the presidency. 24 . Id. at 4. 25. Id. at 3. Gray made an interesting comment in a later memorandum to President Bush's chief of staff, former Governor John Sununu:
We believe that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to allow Congress to compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces through inaction, but no President has wanted to jeopardize congressional support for his actions by defying the Resolution. It often falls to Executive branch lawyers to develop a legal theory permitting the President to avoid triggering the clock. Congress also has been reluctant to permit the President to act in defiance of its interpretation of the Resolution. 
